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Deception is thought to be more effortful than telling the truth. Empirical evidence
from many quarters supports this general proposition. However, there are many factors
that qualify and even reverse this pattern. Guided by a communication perspective,
I present a baker’s dozen of moderators that may alter the degree of cognitive
difficulty associated with producing deceptive messages. Among sender-related factors
are memory processes, motivation, incentives, and consequences. Lying increases
activation of a network of brain regions related to executive memory, suppression of
unwanted behaviors, and task switching that is not observed with truth-telling. High
motivation coupled with strong incentives or the risk of adverse consequences also
prompts more cognitive exertion–for truth-tellers and deceivers alike–to appear credible,
with associated effects on performance and message production effort, depending
on the magnitude of effort, communicator skill, and experience. Factors related to
message and communication context include discourse genre, type of prevarication,
expected response length, communication medium, preparation, and recency of target
event/issue. These factors can attenuate the degree of cognitive taxation on senders so
that truth-telling and deceiving are similarly effortful. Factors related to the interpersonal
relationship among interlocutors include whether sender and receiver are cooperative or
adversarial and how well-acquainted they are with one another. A final consideration is
whether the unit of analysis is the utterance, turn at talk, episode, entire interaction, or
series of interactions. Taking these factors into account should produce a more nuanced
answer to the question of when deception is more difficult than truth-telling.
Keywords: deception, cognitive effort, truth, deceptive message production, moderators of deception displays
Common sense tells us that lying should be more diﬃcult than truth-telling. After all, the truth
is ready-made; the lie must be invented. Ceteris paribus, more eﬀort is involved in fabricating a
falsehood than in accessing and producing a veridical account of something that is already stored
in memory.
But common sense is not always the best teacher. There are many circumstances under which
truth-telling imposes more challenges than deceiving. I therefore want to advance the hypothesis
that the eﬀort associated with deceiving vice truth-telling is a function of the characteristics
of the communication event in force and that deeper analysis of critical elements of the
communication process will bring more clarity to the issue of the cognitive eﬀort associated with
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deceit. Although many such elements have been included as
moderators in deception meta-analyses, their impact has not
necessarily been attributed to cognitive (or emotional) exertion,
and reliable empirical associations are few. A more coherent
framework is therefore wanting.
THE DOMINANT PATTERN
First let us consider the received wisdom that deception is more
diﬃcult than truth and some of the evidence that undergirds it.
Numerous deception scholars have argued that deception is more
eﬀortful than truth-telling (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981; Miller
and Stiﬀ, 1993; Buller and Burgoon, 1996b; Vrij, 2000; Sporer
and Schwandt, 2006). Empirical research has aﬃrmed this view
with evidence of measurable psycho-physiological indicators of
arousal and stress (e.g., the wealth of research on the polygraph;
see Gougler et al., 2011) as well as observable behavioral signs of
performance decrements. Deceptive messages are often shorter,
slower, and less ﬂuent, with longer response latencies, averted
gaze, temporary cessation of gestures and postural rigidity–all
potential indicators of deceivers having to think hard (Goldman-
Eisler, 1958; Vrij et al., 1996, 2006; Rockwell et al., 1997; Porter
and ten Brinke, 2010; ten Brinke and Porter, 2012; Mullin et al.,
2014).
That said, it is important to note that the mental machinations
associated with deception need not be burdensome or uniformly
so. As Buller and Burgoon (1996b) stated in a rejoinder to
DePaulo et al. (1996):
. . .DePaulo et al. (1996) ascribe to us a highly cognitive
view of deception, with deceptive episodes peopled by highly
conscious, surveillant liars and equally vigilant, cunning
receivers. This is an exaggerated characterization of our
assumptions. We have taken some pains in IDT to argue that
much sender and receiver activity during deceptive encounters,
like other communicative encounters, can be goal driven
and strategic yet largely automatic and “mindless” (see, e.g.,
Kellermann, 1992; Burgoon and Langer, 1995). We see deception
running the gamut from the kinds of inconsequential white
lies and evasions that populate daily discourse to the life-
threatening kinds of fabrications and omissions that color
international conﬂicts (Burgoon and Buller, 1996, pp. 320–
321).
The activities involved in message production are familiar,
routinized, overlearned. Mental processes can be activated
without the sender necessarily having signiﬁcant attentional
resources diverted. This is especially likely in the dominant
laboratory research paradigms, which entail telling harmless
and inconsequential lies seldom lasting more than 1 min and
addressing single incidents, factual matters, or likes-dislikes. In
such cases, messages can be constructed on the ﬂy and modiﬁed
in response to emergent exigencies. Senders can tap into a host
of memories and readily accessible schemas that enable rattling
oﬀ a deceptive response. The division of labor between verbal
and non-verbal components of messages further distributes the
workload and reduces the call on cognitive resources. Moreover,
if lies are about inconsequential matters, are at the behest of
an investigator, and entail no adverse consequences, then any
emotional overlay should also be attenuated.
That many forms of deception are “ready-made” does not
invalidate that the other processes surrounding their use, form
and potential consequences still impose more cognitive work
on the sender than does a truthful message related to the same
narrative. But the depiction of deceptive message production
requires more sophisticated modeling. It is not a question of
deception being either easier or more diﬃcult than telling the
truth. It can be both.
A BAKER’S DOZEN OF MODERATORS
Here, then, toward a more nuanced, communication-oriented
view, are a baker’s dozen of factors that should tip the scales
in one direction or another. This non-exhaustive collection
includes sender factors (i.e., ones that reside within the individual
producing a message), message and communication context
factors (i.e., ones related to the content and style of the message
and to the communication context), relationship factors (i.e.,
ones inhering in the interpersonal relationship between sender
and receiver) that should enable predictions of the circumstances
under which deception will be more eﬀortful, and scale of
the measurement window under analysis. I illustrate many
with evidence from our research program on interpersonal and
mediated deception.
Sender Memory Demands
Recent neuroscience research is corroborating what social
scientists have suspected for a long time—that the more a lie
activates diﬀerent mental processes, the more mental taxation it
imposes on a communicator. In their updated conceptualization
of cognitive resource demands associated with (complex) lie
production, Sporer and Schwandt (2007) incorporated newer
models of working memory such that cognitive load extends
beyond accessing details from memory and constructing non-
contradictory messages to also activating autobiographical and
executive memory functions.
Consider that compared to the truth-teller, who needs only
to recall an actual state of aﬀairs, the deceiver must not only
access the true state of aﬀairs but must engage executive memory
to decide if to deceive, evaluate which forms of deception are
more “acceptable” according to one’s moral code and choose
among those options, conduct a cost-beneﬁt calculus of the
relative likelihood of success of alternative forms of deceit,
fabricate the response itself, compare it to the truth for possible
inconsistencies with known facts, check the deceit against a
“plausibility” meter, gage the likelihood of suspicion or detection
by the interlocutor, and then actually assemble the verbal and
non-verbal components into a normal-appearing message that
maximizes credibility, all the while suppressing inapt behaviors
and cognitions.
Early explorations of brain functioning with fMRI conﬁrmed
that these activities have associated changes in brain activation
such that diﬀerent regions show increased activation during lies
than truths (see, e.g., Spence et al., 2001; Ganis et al., 2003;
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Abe and Greene, 2014). In one such test, Spence et al. (2008)
found that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was
preferentially activated to inhibit inappropriate and unwanted
cognitions and responses when lying about embarrassing
material. Using a diﬀerent method, Mameli et al. (2010) found
multiple networks in the prefrontal cortex involved in deceptive
responding as well as longer reaction times when communicators
responded deceptively relative to truthful responses at baseline.
Ito et al. (2011, p. 126) similarly substantiated increased activity
in a network of brain regions in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (plus longer response latencies) when remembering and
reporting truthful and deceptive neutral and emotional events.
The authors did not ﬁnd a similar response during truth-telling,
leading them to suggest that “there is an increase in the amount of
conﬂict and higher cognitive control needed when falsifying the
responses compared to responding truthfully.”
A recent meta-analysis (Christ et al., 2009) further established
that lying is associated with multiple executive control processes,
speciﬁcally working memory, inhibitory control, and task
switching (i.e., interspersing truthful with deceptive details).
Using their activation likelihood estimate method, the authors
demonstrated quantitatively that eight of 13 regions and 173
deception-related foci are consistently more active for deceptive
responses than for truthful ones.
These robust ﬁndings using varied approaches are strong
evidence that deception summons memory processes that are
more taxing than those associated with truth-telling. Thus,
for the predominant research paradigms that have been used,
and holding all other conditions constant, deception requires
engagement of more cognitive (and/or emotional) resources than
does truth-telling1.
Sender Motivation, Incentives, and
Consequences
This general pattern notwithstanding, three interrelated
moderators that can alter this conclusion are motivation,
incentives and consequences. Because motivation has often been
manipulated through high monetary incentives or escaping
adverse consequences, these three factors are operationally
confounded. High motivation is thought to muster more eﬀort,
which can interfere with performance or improve it. The
motivation impairment eﬀect (MIE) asserts that motivation
impairs non-verbal performance, thereby making lies more
transparent, but also facilitates deceivers’ verbal performance
(DePaulo and Kirkendol, 1989; Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Empirical ﬁndings have been fraught with inconsistencies.
Burgoon and Floyd (2000), Burgoon et al. (2012), and Burgoon
et al. (2015) have found both impairment and improvement of
non-verbal and verbal performance among motivated deceivers
engaged in consequential deception. Additionally, high-
motivation truth-tellers (not deceivers) sometimes were most
aﬀected. Two meta-analyses (that omitted the aforementioned
1Space limitations do not permit developing the idea that deception may also
instigate emotional work to regulate the kind of emotional ﬂooding seen, for
example, with escalating conﬂicts. But investigations of high levels of cognitive
arousal may be well consider emotional correlates and regulatory overrides.
investigations) found high motivation aﬀected liars and truth-
tellers equally (Bond and DePaulo, 2006), and high-motivation
lies were neither more nor less detectable than other lies (Hartwig
and Bond, 2014).
If communicators have little to gain from deceiving or to
lose from being caught, lying may pose little more challenge
than truth-telling. Aside from the memory demands discussed
above, small everyday lies such as ﬁbs and white lies are easy to
produce, can draw upon a cache of previously used utterances,
and countenance no danger if detected. Lies that are likely to
summon more cognitive resources are those that yield high pay-
oﬀ if successful or that place the deceiver in serious jeopardy
if uncovered (Porter and ten Brinke, 2010). In an analysis of
real high-stakes deception, ten Brinke and Porter (2012) found
that deceivers feigning distress over their missing children had
diﬃculty faking sadness, leaked expressions of happiness, and
were verbally more reticent and tentative. The authors ascribed
these performance decrements partly to increased cognitive
load. In high-consequence circumstances, however, truthful
individuals may be equally distressed or motivated to succeed,
so the diﬃculty of producing believable messages may be similar
regardless of veracity.
The diverse results suggest that motivation is more
complicated than presupposed and requires more “unpacking” of
its relationship to cognitive eﬀort. From a communication
standpoint, motivation should follow social facilitation
predictions, aiding overlearned behavior and interfering with
less practiced behavior, up to a point beyond which emotional
ﬂooding should impair both verbal and non-verbal performance.
Communicator skill and experience should dictate the threshold
for performance deterioration.
Discourse Genre
Language can be categorized according to genres, which are
discourse forms that share similarities in their structure, style,
content, intended audience, and context in which they occur.
Diﬀerent genres impose qualitatively diﬀerent demands on
deceivers and truth-tellers. A factual narrative or description,
for example, comprises representational and veriﬁable features
that need to be assembled into a cogent, plausible sequence,
and supported by relevant details. Whereas truth-tellers are only
limited by the acuity of their memory when relaying speciﬁcs of
an event, deceivers not only must recall the true state of aﬀairs,
but must decide how much, if any, to tell. They must compare
their alternative version to reality, edit the content and linguistic
form, and assemble the elements into a believable chronology.
Comparatively, an opinion lacks veriﬁability and need not be
accompanied by any supportive documentation. Deceivers can
easily proﬀer indisputable conjectures and opinions when asked
questions such as, “Who do you think may have stolen the money
from the cash draw?” or “What should happen to the thief?”,
whereas the thoughtful reﬂections of a truth-teller may require
more eﬀort.
Within interactive discourse genres are also variations in
form. A face-to-face dialog carries diﬀerent demands than a
monolog or one-to-many speech. When engaged in conversation
with another, interlocutors must fulﬁll multiple communication
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functions beyond message production itself. First, they must
“read” the deﬁnition of the situation from contextual cues so
as to know what kind of discourse and associated expectations
are in force. Because ascertaining identities is usually a high
priority, communicators must signal their self-identity (e.g.,
gender, ethnicity, race, personality), put forth a desired self-
presentation, and size up others’ identities. As interactions
unfold, they must formulate their own messages and decipher
the messages and feedback from their interlocutor. They
must also regulate their emotional expressions, exchange
relational messages that deﬁne the relationship between sender
and receiver (e.g., trusting, intimate, equal), perform turn-
taking responsibilities, and monitor their own communication.
Although human communicators perform these functions in a
seemingly eﬀortless fashion, the discourse form can magnify or
alleviate some of the eﬀort associated with them. For example,
Burgoon et al. (2001) demonstrated that engaging in dialog
compared to face-to-face monolog was more diﬃcult initially,
but over time, dialog eased the demands on deceivers who were
able to share the turn-taking burden with their interlocutor,
create a smooth interaction pattern by developing interactional
synchrony, adapt to interlocutor feedback, and approximate
normal communication patterns2.
Another genre, the interview, can also inﬂuence the cognitive
burden on respondents. The question-answer structure adds
predictability to who is supposed to talk when and what
the content should be. Language can be borrowed from the
interviewer’s questions, and questions can be repeated as a
stalling technique. Even within interviews are notable diﬀerences:
Relative to an open-ended, free-wheeling interview, a structured
one that requires short-answer replies reduces the degrees
of freedom of what can be said and allows deceivers to
forecast what is coming next. Many deception experiments
are of this latter brief-answer variety, which our research has
shown produces substantially diﬀerent behavioral and psycho-
physiological responses than open-ended interview protocols
(Burgoon et al., 2010).
The illustrative genres mentioned here point to the need
to formulate deception-relevant taxonomies of genres so that
predictions can be made as to which will intensify or diminish
the cognitive eﬀort required of sender and receiver.
Form of Prevarication
Contrary to the claims of McCornack et al. (2014) that virtually
all extant deception research bifurcates deception into bald-
faced lies or bald-faced truths, and regards only those discourse
options as worthy of scholarly investigation, most deception
2Although some meta-analyses have attempted to analyze the eﬀects of
communication context or genre on receiver detection accuracy (e.g., Bond and
DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2014), virtually no research has explicitly tested
their eﬀects on sender performance. Hartwig and Bond (2014), for example, had
too few samples of diﬀerent interview types to separate out diﬀerent categories.
Part of the challenge in deriving stable meta-analytic estimates is that only a
small fraction of investigations have entailed interactions exceeding 1 min in
length. Moreover, genre constructs such as interactivity are multidimensional.
To test properly the eﬀects of interaction on senders requires parsing the
diﬀerent attributes (e.g., participation, synchronicity, propinquity, multiplicity of
modalities) and testing each independently to isolate the relevant features.
scholars recognize that deception includes a variety of forms.
A sampling of research across the last ﬁve decades and across
multiple disciplines has identiﬁed such forms of prevarication as
white lies, altruistic lies, omissions, concealment, equivocation,
evasions, exaggerations, strategic ambiguity, and impostership
(see, e.g., Turner et al., 1975; Hopper and Bell, 1984; Miller and
Stiﬀ, 1993; Buller et al., 1994; Searcy and Nowicki, 2005; Ennis
et al., 2008; Knapp, 2008). The type of prevarication being told
will aﬀect the cognitive resources required in its telling.
In his original formulation of information manipulation
theory (IMT), McCornack (1997) proposed that deceptive
discourse violates conversational implicatures along one
or more of Grice’s (1989) four dimensions of cooperative
discourse: quantity, quality, manner, and relation. Burgoon
et al. (1996) proposed a similar set of ﬁve dimensions
of information management: completeness (comparable
to quantity), veridicality (comparable to quality), clarity
(comparable to manner), relevance (comparable to relation), and
personalism (see also Buller and Burgoon, 1996a). Under both
conceptualizations, some forms of deceit such as omissions are
more easily produced than others3.
Other times, truth-telling can be more diﬃcult than deceit.
Having to convey a “hard” truth to a patient dying of a terminal
disease can levy more cognitive taxation than manufacturing a
comparable falsehood that there is hope for recovery from the
disease. A provocative line of research on whether people lie
automatically or must decide to lie has also shown that when
cheating oﬀers a high probability of personal gain, people may
be quicker to produce self-serving lies than truthful responses.
In tempting situations, if a self-beneﬁting lie is easy to craft
and little time is allowed for reﬂection, lying may be the
more automatic response, whereas honesty may necessitate more
hesitation, deliberation, and executive control (Shalvi et al., 2012;
Tabatabaeian et al., 2015; see also Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi, 2015,
for a review of supporting literature). When social bonds are
made salient, people also produce lies more quickly that beneﬁt
their social group than lies that beneﬁt only self (Shalvi and De
Dreu, 2014).
In short, the type of prevarication (or truth) can be located on
a continuum from easy to diﬃcult, with cognitive eﬀort for easy
lies making them no more challenging than telling the truth.
Expected Response Length
Diﬀerent kinds of interactions have associated expectations
about utterance length. Day-to-day conversations are typiﬁed by
reciprocation of short turns at talk. Conversing deceivers may
project that they can get away with very brief responses while still
satisfying conversational expectations. A spouse’s query, “How
was your day?” is not expected to produce a dissertation on all
3The least taxing form is concealment or omission in which deceivers simply leave
out deceptive information. Although McCornack et al. (2014, p. 353) assert in
IMT2 that “Zipf ’s PLE [principle of least eﬀort] compels speakers to minimize
the total number of spoken words produced and shift instead toward objectively
ambiguous language,” a claim consistent with the principle that humans are
cognitively lazy, it fails to comport with the empirical evidence that people
sometimes produce longer messages when deceiving than when telling the truth
(e.g., Burgoon et al., 2014; Dunbar et al., 2014). Brevity, then, or eﬀort is not the
controlling factor.
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one’s trials and tribulations at work or home. A husband who
skipped work to go gambling or a wife on an illicit tryst can safely
reply with a breezy “ﬁne.” Such brief lies and truths—the bread
and butter of much deception research–may diﬀer little in their
demands on resources. More penetrating questions like, “Why
couldn’t I reach you today when I called your cell four times?”
require lengthier–and more demanding–accounts.
Standard interview protocols also have associated expectations
about what response lengths suﬃce. Introspective questions
require conjectural rather than factual responses, and their non-
veriﬁability may attenuate the memory burden on deceivers.
The behavioral analysis interview operates on the premise that
innocent people will exhibit the Sherlock Holmes eﬀect: In
attempting to aid an investigation, innocent respondents may
speculate more than deceivers and widen the pool of suspects.
Comparatively, deceivers should minimize conjecture and avoid
proposing other suspects for fear of narrowing the pool to
themselves (Horvath et al., 2008). A cognitive interview, in
which respondents are asked to retell an account from multiple
vantage points (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992), requests increasing
elaboration and details, something that is expected to be easier for
truth-tellers than deceivers to accomplish over repeated retellings
(see also Vrij and Granhag, 2012).
Generally, conversations have associated norms and
expectations for what kinds of utterances will satisfy the Gricean
maxims, and communicators are fairly adept at predicting and
fulﬁlling those expectations. The degree of cognitive diﬃculty
should correlate positively with response length and how much
the deceptive response deviates from expected form (with
exceptions that can be anticipated in advance).
Sanctioning of Deceit
Most laboratory research involves deceit that is sanctioned by
the experimenter rather than being chosen voluntarily by the
perpetrator (Frank and Feeley, 2003). The alternative of allowing
research participants to choose whether to lie or not creates a
confound in that only skillful liars and those with an honest-
appearing demeanormay choose to lie (Levine et al., 2010). Apart
from experimenter-instigated deceit diﬀering behaviorally from
that chosen of a deceiver’s own volition (Sporer and Schwandt,
2007; Dunbar et al., 2013), the implication outside the laboratory
is that deception will vary substantially in form and diﬃculty as
a function of sanctioning and communicator skill (see also IDT
regarding communicator skill).
That said, choice and skill may not completely alleviate the
added cognitive work associated with deceit. Spence et al. (2008)
designed an fMRI experiment in which deceivers could choose to
comply or defy an experimenter’s request to divulge embarrassing
secrets. Results revealed lying activated the VLPFC even under
free choice. At the most fundamental level of brain functioning,
then, lying still exercises a main eﬀect on cognitive processing.
Communication Medium
The medium of communication itself also inﬂuences the
degree of cognitive diﬃculty associated with lying. IDT’s ﬁrst
proposition states, “Context features of deceptive interchanges
systematically aﬀect sender and receiver cognitions and
behaviors; two of special importance are the interactivity
of the communication medium and the demands of the
conversational task” (Burgoon and Buller, 2015). To the
extent that deceivers are interacting synchronously and with all
audiovisual modalities available to receivers (e.g., face-to-face,
computer-mediated communication, teleconferencing), there
are more communication functions to which cognitive resources
must be devoted. When modalities are more limited–such
as voice or chat–and asynchronous—more resources can be
distributed among fewer aspects of message production and with
less time press.4 Consistent with this reasoning, participants in a
mock theft experienced the least anxiety and cognitive load when
interacting via text, were the most aroused and exercised the most
behavioral control when interacting face-to-face, and reported
the most cognitive eﬀort when interacting via an unfamiliar
audio format (Burgoon et al., 2004; Burgoon, 2015). Thus, leaner
and non-interactive media should attenuate cognitive eﬀort.
Preparation
This construct subsumes many related variables—advance
thought, planning, rehearsal, or editing. Extemporaneous or
unscripted discourse is produced in real time; planned, rehearsed,
or edited discourse entails some intervening time interval
between the deliberation and construction of a message
and its ultimate delivery. Such ex ante preparation may
be experimentally manipulated, as in a classic interviewing
investigation by O’Hair et al. (1981), or it may be prompted
by high-stakes circumstances such as queries about fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting: “. . . individuals may, for example, prepare
extensively before speaking to lower the cognitive burden that
can accompany deception, or may undergo voice training in an
attempt to sound vocally like the antithesis of someone engaging
in deception” (Burgoon et al., 2015, p. 2).
Three meta-analyses (Zuckerman and Driver, 1985; DePaulo
et al., 2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006) included preparation as
a moderator and predicted that planning and rehearsal should
facilitate deceptive performance by reducing cognitive/memory
load. Although the meta-analyses yielded mixed results and
weak eﬀect sizes, planned messages were found to have shorter
responses latencies and fewer silent pauses than unplanned ones.
More recent research examining higher stakes deception has
shown that fraud-relevant utterances were longer and more laden
with details than non-fraudulent ones (Burgoon et al., 2015),
a pattern duplicated by Braun et al. (2015) in their analysis
of deceptive politicians’ messages. To the extent that detection
accuracy is lower with planned than unplanned deception (Bond
and DePaulo, 2006), some of that inaccuracy may be attributable
to planned messages being indistinguishable from truth-telling.
With advance preparation, communicators are better able to
approximate normal, credible communication patterns.
4It might be tempting to conclude that we can infer the degree of cognitive
demands on senders by the accuracy with which their messages are detected by
receivers.However, this would be a faulty inference inasmuch as detection accuracy
is inﬂuenced by several factors other than sender performance (Burgoon et al.,
2008; Burgoon, 2015). For example, deceivers may experience fewer cognitive
demands under audio communication and yet inadvertently produce more telltale
signs of deception due to lack of awareness or ability to manage the voice.
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Recency of Target Incident or Issue
Depending on how distant it is, the time frame for requested
narratives and accounts will have expectations associated with
it for what is a complete, accurate, and clear response. Whereas
recent events should impose equal recall diﬃculty on truth-
tellers and deceivers, long-ago ones should be harder to
recall for conscientious truth-tellers trying to be thorough and
accurate than for deceivers fabricating a story or borrowing
details from similar events. Some interview protocols like the
cognitive interview capitalize on this reversal of expectations
in which longer and more eﬀortful answers should be
associated with truth. Comparison questions in polygraph testing
which are intended to create more mental conﬂict for truth-
tellers than deceivers can be made even more challenging
when the time frame is open-ended. The question, “Have
you ever lied to someone who trusted you?” may prompt
truth-tellers to ponder and hesitate more than deceivers.
Other aspects of cognitive work unique to deceivers are the
activation of executive memory to make the decision to lie,
the construction and selection among possible lies and the
comparison to the truth, which may guide decisions about
which form and content of the lie is likely to be the most
eﬃcacious.
Cooperative-Adversarial Relationship
Intertwined with the genre of discourse is whether the
relationship between communicators constitutes a cooperative or
adversarial one. Grice (1989) proposed that communicators enter
encounters with a presumption of cooperativeness. In practice,
however, many communication contexts and relationships are
recognized as adversarial–criminal interrogations, litigation,
labor disputes, negotiations, dispute mediations, and divorce
proceedings that place the parties at odds with one another,
among others–during which the assumption of cooperativeness
is suspended. In adversarial interactions, one cannot even assume
that interlocutors are using language in the same way. For
example, in organizational contexts, management may practice
strategic ambiguity as a way to reduce rather than facilitate
understanding.
In other cases, participants with hidden agendas may
wish to give the appearance of cooperativeness while covertly
violating the Gricean maxims (McCornack, 1997). Under these
circumstances the success of the deception will depend on
how clandestine the deceit is. Predictions about how much
cognitive diﬃculty is associated with lying should take into
account how much cognitive “work” is needed to keep nefarious
motives hidden. Unwitting interlocutors, for example, may lessen
the diﬃculty for deceivers by proposing plausible explanations
for a sender’s otherwise implausible response, thereby helping
deceivers construct a believable narrative as a dialog unfolds.
Relational Familiarity
Buller and Burgoon (1996b) identiﬁed three types of familiarity,
one of which is relational familiarity. People who are well
acquainted with one another have prior knowledge and a history
of behavior against which to judge anything that is said. For
the deceiver, this can make devising a plausible lie that evades
detection more challenging inasmuch as there are numerous
touchpoints against which the deceiver must make mental
comparisons before actually uttering the lie. At the same time,
deceivers can capitalize on their familiarity with the receiver
to adapt lies more speciﬁcally to the interlocutor’s knowledge
bank and can watch the receiver for telltale signs of disbelief.
Buller and Aune (1987) found deceivers interacting with familiar
others successfully restored their original level of animation,
while deceivers interacting with strangers became less immediate
and animated over time. Thus, deceivers took advantage of their
relationship to improve their performance over time. Burgoon
et al. (2001) found similar results in that deceivers interacting
with friends rather than strangers were better able over time to
manage their informational content, speech ﬂuency, non-verbal
demeanor, and image. Presumably the improved performances
were accompanied by a corresponding reduction in cognitive
diﬃculty for deceivers relative to truth-tellers. Since receivers
seldom expect to be lied to, relational familiarity probably confers
more of an advantage on the sender than the receiver.
Communication Unit of Analysis
The sampling unit for deception research and meta-analyses
typically has been the single utterance, turn at talk, or answer to
a single question. Such samples may be less than 30 s in length.
Yet deception may be woven into a series of utterances (e.g.,
an interview), interpenetrate an entire conversational episode,
or span multiple conversations (e.g., multiple interrogations).
The span of time from beginning to end of a deception event
should aﬀect how diﬃcult it is to produce and maintain.
Speculatively, as the number and duration of utterances related
to an issue increases, the more cognitively challenging it should
be to lie, inasmuch as one must remember what has been
said previously, create consistency among utterances, reconcile
what is being said with a potentially growing population of
known facts, make decisions about which truthful details to
divulge, decide what kinds of deception to enact, whether to
change strategies (e.g., from concealment to equivocation), and
so forth. Lengthy criminal justice interviews and interrogations
depend on extended questioning to create more emotional and
mental hardship for interviewees. Comparatively, producing
brief utterances not only minimizes the amount of decision
making, memory searching and message production demands
that communicators incur (regardless of their veracity) but can
also buy deceivers more time to concoct a credible response and
to intersperse truthful details within one’s discourse to bolster
believability.
The time course of the communication event thus may dictate
its demand on cognitive and emotional resources. As the number
of utterances or interchanges increases, demands on cognitive
and emotional resources should increase diﬀerentially—up
to an as-yet undetermined point. Beyond that, cooperative
interactions should reduce the burden on deceivers by virtue of
availing themselves of receiver feedback, making conversational
repairs and meshing the dyad’s interaction patterns. We have
witnessed this in several of our interviewing experiments. In
one case, interviewees who were blindsided by unexpected
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questions initially gave non-ﬂuent and improbable responses
but with the aid of unwitting interviewers managed to spin
out explanations that the interviewers accepted. Conversely,
adversarial interactions such as interrogations may intensify the
burden on deceivers. In drawing any conclusions, then, about
whether lying is more diﬃcult than truth-telling, it is necessary
to specify the sampling unit for the respective truths and lies—
short utterances or lengthy ones and single episodes or a series
of them. Longer can be more diﬃcult but may also introduce
opportunities for countervailing repairs by deceivers.
IMPLICATIONS
What are the implications of this decomposition of moderators
of cognitive eﬀort? First, the relationship between deception and
cognitive eﬀort is complex and highly variable. In some respects,
the issue is one of deﬁnition of terms: What constitutes eﬀort?
If activation of more brain regions and processes constitutes
eﬀort, then deceit can be construed as creating greater actual
cognitive work than truth. However, if eﬀort requires some
level of awareness, then only under more serious circumstances
involving complex lies with signiﬁcant (favorable or unfavorable)
consequences may lying be experienced as more cognitively
eﬀortful.
Moreover, a variety of moderators can alter the deception-
cognition relationship, and sometimes in contradictory ways.
These previously unidentiﬁed or untested moderators may
account for the oft-times weak association between presumed
cognitive eﬀort and observable behavior. Only if the relevant
inﬂuences can be parsed will it be possible to make sound and
reliable cognition-based predictions and will cognition-based
eﬀects be replicable.
Also confounding the picture is that many factors like
motivation and incentives exert similar inﬂuence on truth-
tellers, thus making deceptive and truthful behavior patterns
indistinguishable.
Too often, researchers have inferred backward from
observable cues to likely cognitive causes, but such reasoning
is fraught with indeterminacy due to the absence of single one-
to-one correspondences between speciﬁc indicators and mental
work. Even though more memory processes may be engaged, the
observable indicators may not betray that work, they may arise
from other causes, and they may be associated with both truth
and deception.
Given these complicating factors, any cognitive load, cue-
based approach may be diﬃcult to utilize in practice. Only if
the various moderators can be taken into account will such
approaches be fully eﬃcacious.
CONCLUSION
This research topic on whether lying is more eﬀortful cognitively
than truth-telling is meant to challenge long-held assumptions.
Challenging assumptions is clearly a worthwhile scientiﬁc
endeavor, and this collection of essays will doubtless enlighten the
issue while raising a number of salient considerations.
In the process of addressing this assumption, however,
let us not erect false dichotomies, straw-man arguments, or
extreme positions that produce more heat than light. For
example, the assertions by McCornack et al. (2014) that the
diﬀerences between truth and deception should all be attributed
to memory and information processing is serious overstatement,
just as their assertion that current models of deception impute
too much cognitive work to deceptive message production is
an overly broad gloss. As with so many issues surrounding
human cognition and behavior, simple answers are facile but
inaccurate and will set our science back. The typology of 13
moderators I have proposed derives from modeling deception
as a communication phenomenon, the properties of which can
exacerbate or alleviate cognitive demands. The non-exhaustive
collection of moderators includes: (1) sender memory demands,
(2) sender motivation, (3) incentives and consequences, (4)
discourse genre, (5) form of prevarication, (6) expected response
length, (7) sanctioning of the deceit, (8) communication medium,
(9) advance preparation, (10) recency of the incident/issue,
(11) relationship among interlocutors (e.g., cooperative or
adversarial), (12) relational familiarity, and (13) size of unit
of analysis. I invite further formalization and empirical testing
by other deception scholars to disentangle the eﬀects of these
signiﬁcant moderators.
REFERENCES
Abe, N., and Greene, J. D. (2014). Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus
accumbens predicts behavior in an independent test of honesty. J. Neurosci. 34,
10564–10572. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0217-14.2014
Bereby-Meyer, Y., and Shalvi, S. (2015). Deliberate honesty. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6,
195–198. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.004
Bond, C. F., and DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10, 214–234. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Braun, M., Van Swol, L. M., and Vang, L. (2015). His lips are moving: pinocchio
eﬀect and other lexical indicators of political deceptions. Discourse Process. 52,
1–20. doi: 10.1080/0163853X.2014.942833
Buller, D. B., andAune, R. K. (1987).Nonverbal cues to deception among intimates,
friends, and strangers. J. Nonverb. Behav. 11, 269–290. doi: 10.1007/BF00987257
Buller, D. B., and Burgoon, J. K. (1996a). Another look at informationmanagement:
a rejoinder to McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and Lapinski. Commun. Monogr.
63, 92–98. doi: 10.1080/03637759609376377
Buller, D. B., and Burgoon, J. K. (1996b). Interpersonal deception theory. Commun.
Theory 6, 203–242. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00127.x
Buller, D. B., Burgoon, J. K., White, C., and Ebesu, A. S. (1994).
Interpersonal deception: VII. behavioral proﬁles of falsiﬁcation,
concealment, and equivocation. J. Lang. Soc. Psychol. 13, 366–395. doi:
10.1177/0261927X94134002
Burgoon, J. K. (2015). Rejoinder to Levine, Clare et al.’s comparison of the Park–
Levine probability model versus interpersonal deception theory: application
to deception detection. Hum. Commun. Res. 41, 327–349. doi: 10.1111/hcre.
12065
Burgoon, J. K., Blair, J. P., and Strom, R. (2008). Cognitive biases, modalities and
deception detection.Hum. Commun. Res. 34, 572–599.
Burgoon, J. K., and Buller, D. B. (1996). Reﬂections on the nature of theory building
and the theoretical status of interpersonal deception theory. Commun. Theory
6, 311–328. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00132.x
Burgoon, J. K., and Buller, D. B. (2015). “Interpersonal deception theory: Purposive
and interdependent behavior during deceptive interpersonal interactions,” in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1965
Burgoon When Deceiving is Harder than Truth-Telling
Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication, 2e, eds D. O. Braithwaite
and P. Schrodt (Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications), 349–362.
Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., and Floyd, K. (2001). Does participation aﬀect
deception success? A test of the inter-activity eﬀect. Hum. Commun. Res. 27,
503–534.
Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Guerrero, L. K., Aﬁﬁ, W., and Feldman, C.
(1996). Interpersonal deception: XII. Information management dimensions
underlying deceptive and truthful messages. Commun. Monogr. 63, 50–69. doi:
10.1080/03637759609376374
Burgoon, J. K., and Floyd, K. (2000). Testing for the motivation impairment eﬀect
during deceptive and truthful interaction. Western J. Commun. 64, 243–267.
doi: 10.1080/10570310009374675
Burgoon, J. K., and Langer, E. (1995). “Language, fallacies, and mindlessness-
mindfulness,” in Communication Yearbook 18, ed. B. Burleson (Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publication), 105–132.
Burgoon, J. K., Marett, K., and Blair, J. P. (2004). “Detecting deception in
computer-mediated communication,” in Computers in Society: Privacy, Ethics
and the Internet, ed. J. F. George (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall),
154–166.
Burgoon, J. K., Mayew, W. J., Giboney, J. S., Elkins, A. C., Moﬃtt, K., Dorn, B.,
et al. (2015). Which spoken language markers identify deception in high-stakes
settings? Evidence from earnings conference calls. J. Lang. Soc. Psychol. doi:
10.1177/0261927X15586792
Burgoon, J. K., Nunamaker, J. F. Jr., and Metaxas, D. (2010). Noninvasive
Measurement of Multimodal Indicators of Deception and Credibility. Final
Report to the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment. Tucson: University
of Arizona.
Burgoon, J. K., Proudfoot, J. G., Wilson, D., and Schuetzler, R. (2014). Patterns
of nonverbal behavior associated with truth and deception: illustrations from
three experiments. J. Nonverb. Behav. 38, 325–354. doi: 10.1007/s10919-014-
0181-5
Burgoon, J. K., Qin, T., Hamel, L., and Proudfoot, J. (2012). “Predicting veracity
from linguistic indicators,” in Paper Presented to the Workshop on Innovation
in Border Control (WIBC) at the European Intelligence and Security Informatics
Conference (EISIC), Odense.
Christ, E. C., van Essen, D. C., Watson, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., and McDermott,
K. B. (2009). The contributions of prefrontal cortex and executive control to
deception: Evidence from activation likelihood estimate meta-analyses. Cereb.
Cortex 19, 1557–1566. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhn189
DePaulo, B. M., Ansﬁeld, M. E., and Bell, K. L. (1996). lnterpersonal deception
theory. Commun. Theory 6, 297–310. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00131.x
DePaulo, B., and Kirkendol, S. E. (1989). “The motivational impairment eﬀect
in the communication of deception,” in Credibility Assessment, ed. J. Yuille
(Deurne: Kluwer), 51–70.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K.,
and Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychol. Bull. 129, 74–118. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74
Dunbar, N. E., Jensen, M. L., Bessabarova, E., Burgoon, J. K., Bernard, D. R.,
Robertson, K. J., et al. (2014). Empowered by persuasive deception: the eﬀects
of power and deception on interactional dominance, credibility, and decision-
making. Commun. Res. 41, 852–876. doi: 10.1177/0093650212447099
Dunbar, N. E., Jensen, M. L., Burgoon, J. K., Kelley, K. M., Harrison, K. J.,
Adame, B., et al. (2013). Eﬀects of veracity, modality and sanctioning on
credibility assessment during mediated and unmediated interviews. Commun.
Res. 40, 1–26.
Ennis, E., Vrij, A., and Chance, C. (2008). Individual diﬀerences and lying in
everyday life. J. Soc. Pers. Relat. 25, 105–118. doi: 10.1177/0265407507086808
Fisher, R. P., and Geiselman, R. E. (1992). Memory-Enhancing Techniques for
Investigative Interviewing: The Cognitive Interview. Springﬁeld, IL: Charles C
Thomas.
Frank, M. G., and Feeley, T. H. (2003). To catch a liar: Challenges for
research in lie detection training. J. Appl. Commun. Res. 31, 58–75. doi:
10.1080/00909880305377
Ganis, G., Kosslyn, S. M., Stose, S., Thompson, W. L., and Yurgelun-Todd, D. A.
(2003). Neural correlates of diﬀerent types of deception: an fMRI investigation.
Cereb. Cortex 13, 830–836. doi: 10.1093/cercor/13.8.830
Goldman-Eisler, F. (1958). Speech analysis and mental processes. Lang. Speech 1,
59–75.
Gougler,M., Nelson, R., Handler, M., Krapohl, D., Shaw, P., and Bierman, L. (2011).
Meta-analytic survey of criterion accuracy of validated polygraph techniques.
Polygraph 40, 194–305.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Hartwig, M., and Bond, C. F. Jr. (2014). Lie detection from multiple cues: a
meta-analysis. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 28, 661–676. doi: 10.1002/acp.3052
Hopper, R., and Bell, R. A. (1984). Broadening the deception construct. Q. J. Speech
70, 288-302.
Horvath, F., Blair, J. P., and Buckley, J. P. (2008). The behavioural
analysis interview: clarifying the practice, theory and understanding
of its use and eﬀectiveness. Int. J. Police Sci. Manag. 10, 101–118. doi:
10.1350/ijps.2008.10.1.101
Ito, A., Abe, N., Fujii, T., Ueno, A., Koseki, Y., Hashimoto, R., et al.
(2011). The role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in deception when
remembering neutral and emotional events. Neurosci. Res. 69, 121–128. doi:
10.1016/j.neures.2010.11.001
Kellermann, K. (1992). Communication: inherently strategic and primarily
automatic. Commun. Monogr. 59, 288–300. doi: 10.1080/036377592093
76270
Knapp, M. L. (2008). Lying and Deception in Human Interaction. Boston, MA:
Allyn and Bacon.
Levine, T. R., Shaw, A., and Shulman, H. C. (2010). Increasing deception detection
accuracy with strategic questioning. Hum. Commun. Res. 36, 216–231. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-2958.2010.01374.x
Mameli, F., Mrakic-Sposta, S., Vergari, M., Fumagalli, M., Macis, M., Ferrucci, R.,
et al. (2010). Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex speciﬁcally processes general – but
not personal –knowledge deception: multiple brain networks for lying. Behav.
Brain Res. 211, 164–168. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2010.03.024
McCornack, S. A. (1997). “The generation of deceptive messages: laying the
groundwork for a viable theory of interpersonal deception,” in Message
Production: Advances in Communication Theory, ed. J. O. Greene (Mahwah, NJ:
LEA), 91–126.
McCornack, S. A., Morrison, K., Paik, J. E., Wisner, A. M., and Zhu, X.
(2014). Information manipulation theroy 2 a propositional theroy of
deceptive discourse production. J. Lang. and Soc. Psychol., 33, 348–377. doi:
10.1177/0261927x14534656
Miller, G. R., and Stiﬀ, J. B. (1993).Deceptive Communication. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publcation.
Mullin, D. S., King, G. W., Saripalle, S. K., Derakhshani, R. R., Lovelace, C. T., and
Burgoon, J. K. (2014). Deception eﬀects on standing center of pressure. Hum.
Mov. Sci. 38, 106–115. doi: 10.1016/j.humov.2014.08.009
O’Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., and McLaughlin, M. L. (1981). Prepared lies,
spontaneous lies, Machiavellianism and nonverbal communication. Hum.
Commun. Res. 7, 325–339. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.1981.tb00579.x
Porter, S., and ten Brinke, L. (2010). The truth about lies: what works in
detecting high-stakes deception? Legal Criminol. Psychol. 15, 57–75. doi:
10.1348/135532509X433151
Rockwell, P., Buller, D. B., and Burgoon, J. K. (1997). The voice of deceit: reﬁning
and expanding vocal cues to deception. Commun. Res. Rep. 14, 451–459. doi:
10.1080/08824099709388688
Searcy, W. A., and Nowicki, S. (2005). The Evolution of Animal Communication:
Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Shalvi, S., and De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Oxytocin promotes group
serving dishonesty. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 5503–5507. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1400724111
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., and Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012). Honesty requires time (and
lack of justiﬁcations). Psychol. Sci. 23, 1264–1270. doi: 10.1177/0956797612
443835
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F. D., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., and
Woodruﬀ, P. W. R. (2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates
of deception in humans. Neuroreport 12, 2849–2853. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
200109170-00019
Spence, S. A., Kaylor-Hughes, C., Farrow, T. F. D., and Wilkinson, I. D.
(2008). Speaking of secrets and lies: the contribution of ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex to vocal deception. Neuroimage 40, 1411–1418. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.035
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1965
Burgoon When Deceiving is Harder than Truth-Telling
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal indicators of deception: a
meta-analytic synthesis.Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 20, 421–446. doi: 10.1002/acp.1190
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2007). Moderators of nonverbal indicators of
deception: a meta-analytic synthesis. Psychol. Public Policy Law 13, 1–34. doi:
10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1
Tabatabaeian, M., Dale, R., and Duran, N. (2015). Self-serving dishonest decisions
can show facilitated cognitive dynamics. Cogn. Process. 16, 291–300. doi:
10.1007/s10339-015-0660-6
ten Brinke, L., and Porter, S. (2012). Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioral
consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception. Law Hum.
Behav. 36, 469–477. doi: 10.1037/h0093929
Turner, R. E., Edgley, C., and Olmstead, G. (1975). Information control in
conversations: honesty is not always the best policy. Kansas J. Speech 11, 69–89.
Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the
Implications for Professional Practices. West Sussex: JohnWiley and Sons.
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., and Leal, S. (2006). Detecting deception by
manipulating cognitive load. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 10, 141–142. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.003
Vrij, A., and Granhag, P. A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and truth: what
matters are the questions asked. J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn. 1, 110–117. doi:
10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004
Vrij, A., Semin, G. R., and Bull, R. (1996). Insight into behavior displayed
during deception. Hum. Commun. Res. 22, 544–562. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2958.1996.tb00378.x
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., and Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and
nonverbal communication of deception. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 14, 1–59. doi:
10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60369-X
Zuckerman, M., and Driver, R. (1985). “Telling lies: verbal and nonverbal
correlates of deception,” in Nonverbal Communication: An Integrated
Perspective, eds A. W. Siegman and S. Feldstein (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
129–147.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Burgoon. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1965
